Peer-Reviewed Publication
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• State As Salesman: International Economic Engagement and Foreign News Coverage in China​. 
  with Chengyuan Ji (Shanghai Jiaotong University)
  2022, Political Communication, 39(1): pp.122-145. 
  For an authoritarian regime, what is the value of providing news on other countries for domestic audience? While it is politically expedient to cover foreign countries negatively, we argue that a regime’s economic interest can motivate it to strategically vary its news coverage; specifically, favorable coverage is given to its close economic partners in order to boost popular support for continued engagement. To test this argument, we examine foreign news coverage by China’s state-run television network between 2003 and 2018. Combining textual and quantitative analyses, we find that countries with stronger economic ties with China receive significantly more favorable news coverage. Moreover, analysis of survey data shows that Chinese public opinion is responsive to such news coverage. The findings demonstrate a pragmatic use of information control by an authoritarian government. It also shows that news media can serve to promote economic openness instead of protectionism.​ 
  [DOI][Reprint][Replication Data]

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• The Logic of Authoritarian Political Selection: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment in China. 
  2019, Political Science Research and Methods, 7(4): pp.853-870. 
  Political selection is important to authoritarian regime survival. Although selection outcomes are often observed, it is difficult to decipher elites' logic of decision-making due to their multidimensional preference and the opaque process. Employing a conjoint experiment conducted among over 300 government officials in China, this paper unpacks multidimensional elite preference in entry-level political selection. It finds that while elites comply with institutional norms by selecting candidates based on competence and loyalty, they also take into account personal preference by favoring those with political connections. Kinship ties to government increase a candidate's chance by over 20 percentage points, even though the candidate is not deemed more competent or loyal. These findings demonstrate that authoritarian elites do not always follow the logic of regime survival; there exists an agency problem in political selection that could undermine the effectiveness of the ruling class over time. ​
  [DOI][Reprint][Replication Data]

Working Papers
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• Authoritarian Co-Optation with Upward Mobility: Merit-Based Elite Recruitment in China.
  ​Why is meritocracy adopted in authoritarian elite recruitment, despite its adverse impact on individual elites’ private interests? Examining the national civil service exam (NCSE) in China, I argue that, by regularly recruiting new political elites based on merit instead of patronage ties, an authoritarian regime can create a steady degree of upward mobility for ordinary citizens, which enhances their perception of future prospect and increases their tolerance of existing inequality. Employing a generalized difference-in-differences design that leverages provincial variation in NCSE implementation date and cohort variation in NCSE eligibility, I find that NCSE has a significant positive effect on how college-educated youths perceive their own upward mobility; correspondingly, it has a dampening effect on their demand for income redistribution. Additional tests on causal mechanisms show that NCSE has such effects because it makes working in government a viable career choice for more citizens, regardless of family background and patronage ties. These findings demonstrate that, by institutionalizing merit-based elite recruitment, the Chinese government is able to co-opt large number of citizens without expanding redistribution, thus further stabilize the regime. It also highlights the importance of upward mobility in authoritarian regime dynamics.  

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• Becoming Political Candidates in China: Elite University Network and Selectoral Advantage.​ [PDF]
  with Yuhua Wang (Harvard University)
  Whether a political system can attract high-quality candidates is a key to produce high-quality politicians. In this article, we examine the issue of candidate pool formation in developing countries where elections are absent. We argue that a government can attract competent individuals to become candidates when it can provide them with significant selectoral advantage. Exploiting a natural experiment in China, where universities adopt an arbitrary score cutoff to enroll students, we show that students attending top elite universities, which en- joy strong alumni networks in politics, are more likely to be interested in a political career than their peers in other universities. Analysis of an original online survey confirms that alumni networks serve as a causal mechanism by enhancing elite university students’ future prospect in political selection. Our study differs from existing research that focuses on the role of election in choosing the “good types” and shows that social networks can serve as an effective instrument to attract the best talents to work for the government. ​
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• A Golden Rice Bowl? The Civil Service Effect on Personal Income in China.
  Given the low-powered incentives typical of a government organization, does an authoritarian regime reward its civil servants with less income in exchange for deferred promotion, or does it pay them more to garner support for the regime? Using data from seven waves of a national survey, I find a strong positive civil service effect on personal income in China, which has grown substantially since the 1990s. The income effect is heterogeneous across age and education subgroups and it is more pronounced for the less experienced and less educated. Additional tests show that the effect is not driven by high rent-paying government positions at the top, but a systemic feature that disproportionally rewards lower ranks. These findings suggest that the CCP regime uses monetary reward to co-opt civil servants instead of incentivizing performance.
  
  

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Work in Progress

• Making Propaganda Sell: Outsourcing and Marketization of Patriotic Film Production in China (with Linan Yao).
  
• Self-Selection into Civil Service in China: Individual Traits and (Mis)Beliefs (with Bo Feng and Qiwei He).
  
• Authoritarian Elite Recruitment: When is Meritocracy Adopted?