Peer-Reviewed Publication
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• The Logic of Authoritarian Political Selection: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment in China. 
  Forthcoming, Political Science Research and Methods.
  [PDF] [Appendix] [Replication Files]
  Political selection is important to authoritarian regime survival. Although selection outcomes are often observed, it is difficult to decipher elites' logic of decision-making due to their multidimensional preference and the opaque process. Employing a conjoint experiment conducted among over 300 government officials in China, this paper unpacks multidimensional elite preference in entry-level political selection. It finds that while elites comply with institutional norms by selecting candidates based on competence and loyalty, they also take into account personal preference by favoring those with political connections. Kinship ties to government increase a candidate's chance by over 20 percentage points, even though the candidate is not deemed more competent or loyal. These findings demonstrate that authoritarian elites do not always follow the logic of regime survival; there exists an agency problem in political selection that could undermine the effectiveness of the ruling class over time. ​
  

Working Papers
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• Authoritarian Co-Optation with Upward Mobility: Merit-Based Elite Recruitment in China.
  ​Why is meritocracy adopted in authoritarian elite recruitment, despite its adverse impact on individual elites’ private interests? Examining the national civil service exam (NCSE) in China, I argue that, by regularly recruiting new political elites based on merit instead of patronage ties, an authoritarian regime can create a steady degree of upward mobility for ordinary citizens, which enhances their perception of future prospect and increases their tolerance of existing inequality. Employing a generalized difference-in-differences design that leverages provincial variation in NCSE implementation date and cohort variation in NCSE eligibility, I find that NCSE has a significant positive effect on how college-educated youths perceive their own upward mobility; correspondingly, it has a dampening effect on their demand for income redistribution. Additional tests on causal mechanisms show that NCSE has such effects because it makes working in government a viable career choice for more citizens, regardless of family background and patronage ties. These findings demonstrate that, by institutionalizing merit-based elite recruitment, the Chinese government is able to co-opt large number of citizens without expanding redistribution, thus further stabilize the regime. It also highlights the importance of upward mobility in authoritarian regime dynamics.  

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• Elite School Networks and Working for the Government: Natural Experimental Evidence from China.​ [PDF]
  with Yuhua Wang (Harvard University)
  Why do political networks persist? Scholars have previously focused on the demand side: politicians promote their alumni, protege, and relatives to keep their grip on power. We provide a supply-side explanation that citizens choose a political career if they believe their network can enhance their career prospects. Specifically, we examine whether elite school networks in the government incentivize students from the same schools to pursue a career in the civil service. Exploiting a natural experiment in China, where universities use an arbitrary cutoff score to enroll students, we show that students attending elite universities, which have strong alumni networks in the government, are on average 25% more likely to prefer a political career than those attending other universities. An original online survey confirms that alumni networks serve as a causal mechanism. Our study provides a new explanation of the entrenchment of power and establishes a causal relationship between existing political networks and candidates’ career preferences. ​
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• Authoritarian Media Bias in International Context: A Tale of Commercial Peace. [PDF]
  with Chengyuan Ji (Peking University)
  This paper examines authoritarian media bias in its coverage of international news, using the case of China. Employing machine-learning methods to analyze the text of over 28,000 pieces of international news aired on the state-run television network between 2003 and 2015, and combining results of text analysis with other country-level observational data, we find that countries with stronger trade ties with China receive significantly more favorable news coverage. Additionally, using multiple waves of survey data, we find that public opinion on foreign countries is susceptible to such media bias. These findings show clear evidence on how an authoritarian government strategically uses media bias to shape public opinion on foreign countries, in order to achieve its foreign policy goals. Moreover, it sheds light on a particular mechanism through which commercial peace is achieved by an authoritarian regime.
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• A Golden Rice Bowl? The Civil Service Effect on Personal Income in China.
  Given the low-powered incentives typical of a government organization, does an authoritarian regime reward its civil servants with less income in exchange for deferred promotion, or does it pay them more to garner support for the regime? Using data from seven waves of a national survey, I find a strong positive civil service effect on personal income in China, which has grown substantially since the 1990s. The income effect is heterogeneous across age and education subgroups and it is more pronounced for the less experienced and less educated. Additional tests show that the effect is not driven by high rent-paying government positions at the top, but a systemic feature that disproportionally rewards lower ranks. These findings suggest that the CCP regime uses monetary reward to co-opt civil servants instead of incentivizing performance.
  
  

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Work in Progress

• Authoritarian Elite Recruitment: When is Meritocracy Adopted?