Research

Peer-Reviewed Publication

Meritocracy as Authoritarian Co-Optation: Political Selection and Upward Mobility in China. [DOI]
Forthcoming, American Political Science Review.
Why does an authoritarian regime adopt meritocracy in its political selection? I argue that meritocracy can be used to co-opt large numbers of ordinary citizens by providing them with an opportunity of socioeconomic advancement instead of income redistribution, as long as the selection process is viewed as inclusive and rule-based. Focusing on the civil service examination in contemporary China, I examine how this meritocratic selection has shaped the relationship between college graduates and the Chinese regime. Exploiting a spatial-cohort variation in applicant eligibility, I find that the exam boosts college graduates’ perceived upward mobility, which in turn weakens their demand for redistribution even in the face of growing inequality. These findings point to an alternative mode of authoritarian co-optation and highlight the role of upward mobility in regime stability.

State As Salesman: International Economic Engagement and Foreign News Coverage in China. [DOI][Reprint]
with Chengyuan Ji (Shanghai Jiaotong University)
2022, Political Communication, 39(1): pp.122-145.
For an authoritarian regime, what is the value of providing news on other countries for domestic audience? While it is politically expedient to cover foreign countries negatively, we argue that a regime’s economic interest can motivate it to strategically vary its news coverage; specifically, favorable coverage is given to its close economic partners in order to boost popular support for continued engagement. To test this argument, we examine foreign news coverage by China’s state-run television network between 2003 and 2018. Combining textual and quantitative analyses, we find that countries with stronger economic ties with China receive significantly more favorable news coverage. Moreover, analysis of survey data shows that Chinese public opinion is responsive to such news coverage. The findings demonstrate a pragmatic use of information control by an authoritarian government. It also shows that news media can serve to promote economic openness instead of protectionism.

The Logic of Authoritarian Political Selection: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment in China. [DOI][Reprint]
2019, Political Science Research and Methods, 7(4): pp.853-870.
Political selection is important to authoritarian regime survival. Although selection outcomes are often observed, it is difficult to decipher elites' logic of decision-making due to their multidimensional preference and the opaque process. Employing a conjoint experiment conducted among over 300 government officials in China, this paper unpacks multidimensional elite preference in entry-level political selection. It finds that while elites comply with institutional norms by selecting candidates based on competence and loyalty, they also take into account personal preference by favoring those with political connections. Kinship ties to government increase a candidate's chance by over 20 percentage points, even though the candidate is not deemed more competent or loyal. These findings demonstrate that authoritarian elites do not always follow the logic of regime survival; there exists an agency problem in political selection that could undermine the effectiveness of the ruling class over time.

Entertainment as Trojan Horse: Voluntary Consumption of Propaganda in China. [PDF]
with Linan Yao (Columbia University)
For authoritarian propaganda to fulfill its persuasive function, it must first reach the intended audiences and garner their attention. What makes people living under authoritarianism willingly consume some pieces of propaganda but not others? In this article, we examine this question by studying a new genre of propaganda movies in China known as "main melody movies." Leveraging data on box office performance and a survey experiment, we find that the entertainment value of propaganda movies is key to increasing consumption; the effect is particularly pronounced for groups that are least inclined to consume propaganda in the first place. Moreover, when propaganda can provide entertainment, audiences are less averse to its political indoctrination. These findings highlight the multi-dimensional nature of propaganda and shed light on how authoritarian regimes increase the reach of their propaganda by attracting audiences with various other utilities. They also point to the increasing "Hollywoodization" of propaganda movies in contemporary China.

Becoming Political Candidates in China: Elite University Network and Selectoral Advantage. [PDF]
with Yuhua Wang (Harvard University)
Whether a political system can attract high-quality candidates is a key to produce high-quality politicians. In this article, we examine the issue of candidate pool formation in developing countries where elections are absent. We argue that a government can attract competent individuals to become candidates when it can provide them with significant selectoral advantage. Exploiting a natural experiment in China, where universities adopt an arbitrary score cutoff to enroll students, we show that students attending top elite universities, which en- joy strong alumni networks in politics, are more likely to be interested in a political career than their peers in other universities. Analysis of an original online survey confirms that alumni networks serve as a causal mechanism by enhancing elite university students’ future prospect in political selection. Our study differs from existing research that focuses on the role of election in choosing the “good types” and shows that social networks can serve as an effective instrument to attract the best talents to work for the government.

A Golden Rice Bowl? The Civil Service Effect on Personal Income in China.
Given the low-powered incentives typical of a government organization, does an authoritarian regime reward its civil servants with less income in exchange for deferred promotion, or does it pay them more to garner support for the regime? Using data from seven waves of a national survey, I find a strong positive civil service effect on personal income in China, which has grown substantially since the 1990s. The income effect is heterogeneous across age and education subgroups and it is more pronounced for the less experienced and less educated. Additional tests show that the effect is not driven by high rent-paying government positions at the top, but a systemic feature that disproportionally rewards lower ranks. These findings suggest that the CCP regime uses monetary reward to co-opt civil servants instead of incentivizing performance.

Self-Selection into Civil Service in China: Individual Traits and (Mis)Beliefs (with Bo Feng and Qiwei He).
Playing It Well but Safe: Female Leadership and Land Sales in Chinese Localities.
Authoritarian Elite Recruitment: When is Meritocracy Adopted?